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MANDATE INTERRUPTED: THE PROBLEMATIC 
LEGACY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
DAVID PETTIGREW, PH.D.* 
ABSTRACT 
The mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), which was founded in 1993, was "to bring to justice 
those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991 and thus contribute to the 
restoration and maintenance of peace in the region."1 However, this essay 
will argue that the proceedings and Judgements of the ICTY have not 
contributed to the restoration of peace in the region, and in certain 
respects, have rather bred disappointment and cynicism. This analysis 
does not deny the virtues of certain aspects of the operations of the 
Tribunal nor does it refute the Tribunal's claim that it "irreversibly 
changed the landscape of international humanitarian law, provided 
victims an opportunity to voice the horrors they witnessed and 
experienced, and proved that those suspected of bearing the greatest 
responsibility for atrocities committed during armed conflicts can be 
called to account."2 The Tribunal's Indictments and Judgements have 
indeed provided extensive documentation of the atrocities that were 
committed. Through the testimony of the survivors, the proceedings gave a 
profoundly important voice to those who the perpetrators attempted to 
erase from the world and memory. However, in spite of those procedural 
 
 
*  David Pettigrew is a Professor of Philosophy at Southern Connecticut State University. 
1   United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Mandate and 
Crimes under ICTY Jurisdiction, http://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/mandate-and-crimes-under-
icty-jurisdiction. 
2  International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 1993-2017, https://www.icty.org/ 











virtues and outcomes, the disappointment by survivors concerning the 
limits of justice has also been expressed and documented: '"How can you 
measure justice against all I have suffered?' asked a witness whose 
husband and two sons had perished during the 1993 assault on Ahmići. 
'It’s just a word. It means nothing.'"3  The current analysis seeks to 
emphasize that the disappointment felt by survivors of the genocide and 
other war crimes has been compounded, for example, by short prison 
sentences, early releases of the convicted perpetrators, and the failure to 
achieve convictions for genocide.  The disheartening outcome of the legal 
proceedings seems to have enabled the rise of hate speech,4 genocide 
denial,5 the glorification of convicted war criminals,6 and the suppression 
of memorials for the victims in Republika Srpska.7  Such divisive rhetoric, 
far from restoring peace, has served to destabilize Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and has led some to reflect that the region may be on the 







3   Eric Stover, The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in the Hague 142 (2005). 
4  See, e.g., Igor Spaic, Bosnian Serb President in 'Hate Speech' Probe, BALKANINSIGHT 
(July 18, 2017), https://balkaninsight.com/2017/07/18/bosnian-serb-president-in-hate-speech-probe-
07-18-2017. 
5 Bosnian Serb Leader Denies Genocide in Srebrenica, APNEWS (Aug. 14, 2018), 
https://apnews.com/b76aa3d8b227474aa065ce3464dca714. 
6  For a report on a commemorative plaque honoring Ratko Mladić see Na Vracama 
postavljena ploča u čast ratnog zločinca Ratka Mladića, KLIX (May 6, 2014), 
https://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/na-vracama-postavljena-ploca-u-cast-ratnog-zlocinca-ratka-
mladica/140605030. See also David Pettigrew, Spomen-ploča Mladiću nastavak genocida, ALJAZEERA 
BALKANS (AUG. 19, 2014), http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/spomen-ploca-mladicu-nastavak-
genocida. 
7  See, e.g., Emina Dizdarevic, Bosnians Mark 25 Years Since Omarska Camp Closure, 
BALKANINSIGHT (Aug, 4, 2018), https://balkaninsight.com/2017/08/04/bosnians-mark-25-years-
since-omarska-camp-closure-08-04-2017. 
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I. LOSING FAITH 
There was a reasonable expectation, at the beginning of the work of the 
ICTY, that those who played leadership roles in provoking and 
implementing the atrocities designed to achieve ethnic homogeneity in 
Bosnian Serb-claimed territory of Republika Srpska, would be brought to 
justice. Leaders such as Radovan Karadžić and Vojislav Šešelj 
orchestrated the war crimes and relished their respective roles in doing so.  
However, it has been precisely the proceedings and outcomes of the 
Karadžić and Šešelj prosecutions that have cast a pall over the legacy of 
the ICTY, and raised questions about the ability of the ICTY to bring the 
perpetrators to justice.9 In October 2009, eight municipalities were 
eliminated from the indictment of Radovan Karadžić to expedite the 
proceedings in “the interest of justice.”10 The excluded municipalities were 
simply "struck-through" in the marked-up indictment.11 The removal of the 
municipalities from the indictment may well have led to the failure to 
achieve a genocide conviction for Count 1. The Trial Chamber indeed 
found that "in light of the systematic and organised manner in which 
crimes were committed in each of the Municipalities... there existed a 
common plan to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian 
Croats from Bosnian Serb claimed territory..."12 The Chamber asserted 
moreover that "the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership agreed on 
 
 
9  See Geoffrey Nice: Verdict on Karadzic is too lenient, RADIO SLOBODNA EUROPA (March 
28, 2016), https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/geoffrey-nice-verdict-on-karadzic-is-too-
lenient/27639840.html. See also Vojislav Seselj's Acquittal is a Victory for Advocates of Ethnic 
Cleansing, THE ECONOMIST (March 31, 2016), 
https://www.economist.com/europe/2016/03/31/vojislav-seseljs-acquittal-is-a-victory-for-advocates-
of-ethnic-cleansing.  
10  Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Decision on the Application of Rule 73 
BIS (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2009), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tdec/en/091008.pdf (indicating that "[t]he municipalities 
removed in their entirety are Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Petrovac, Cajnice, Donji Vakuf, Ilijas, 
Kalinovik, Kator Varos, and Visegrad"). 
11  Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Third Amended Indictment: Prosecution's 
Marked-Up Indictment, ¶14 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 19, 2009), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/ind/en/markedup_indictment_091019.pdf. 
12  Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, ¶ 3447 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the 














...the measures they would take to create their own ethnically 
homogeneous state."13 However, in spite of this finding, Karadžić was 
acquitted of genocide under Count 1, including on Appeal.14 This was a 
Judgement that may well have been affected by the removal of the eight 
municipalities from the indictment. The Chamber found that there was an 
"organized and systematic pattern of crimes committed" against non-Serbs 
in the municipalities, that there was eliticide, unlawful detention in 
approximately 50 detention facilities in which living conditions were 
deplorably inhumane, including "torture, beatings, and psychological and 
physical abuse," and that there was the murder of non-Serbs in the villages 
and  the concentration camps on a "mass scale".15  However, in spite of 
these findings regarding crimes committed as part of the common plan in 
the seven municipalities remaining in the indictment, the Chamber was 
"not convinced that the evidence demonstrated that this amounted to 
conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the 
Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats in these municipalities"...and was not 
satisfied "that the acts... were carried out with genocidal intent."16 
Moreover, the agreement to remove eight municipalities from the 
indictment meant more specifically that there would no genocide 
conviction for the crimes committed in Višegrad, since it was one of the 
excluded municipalities.17 But the Trial Chamber in the Lukić case had 
found in 2009 that the atrocities committed in Višegrad, at Pionirska Street 
 
 
13  Id. at ¶ 3447. 
14  See Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, ¶ 6071, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia March 24, 2016),  
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf. Also see Prosecutor v Karadžić, 
Case No. (MICT-13-55), Appeal Judgement (Int'l Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals Apr. 
11, 2018) https://www.irmct.org/en/cases/mict-13-55. 
15  Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgement Summary, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for 
the former Yugoslavia March 24, 2016), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement_summary.pdf. 
16  Id. 
17  Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Decision on the Application of 
Rule 73 BIS (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2009), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tdec/en/091008.pdf. (holding that "[t]he municipalities removed 
in their entirety are Bosanska Krupa, Bosanski Petrovac, Cajnice, Donji Vakuf, Ilijas, Kalinovik, Kator 
Varos, and Visegrad.") 











house, and in the Bikavac neighborhood, stood out as the most heinous 
crimes of the 20th century in terms of the "viciousness"... and "sheer 
callousness, monstrosity and brutality of herding, trapping and locking the 
victims in the two houses," and setting them on fire and burning them 
alive: 
The Pionirska street fire and the Bikavac fire exemplify the worst 
acts of inhumanity that a person may inflict upon others. In the all 
too long, sad and wretched history of man’s inhumanity to man, the 
Pionirska street and Bikavac fires must rank high. At the close of 
the twentieth century, a century marked by war and bloodshed on a 
colossal scale, these horrific events stand out for the viciousness of 
the incendiary attack, for the obvious premeditation and calculation 
that defined it, for the sheer callousness and brutality of herding, 
trapping and locking the victims in the two houses, thereby 
rendering them helpless in the ensuing inferno, and for the degree of 
pain and suffering inflicted on the victims as they were burnt alive. 
There is a unique cruelty in expunging all traces of the individual 
victims which must heighten the gravity ascribed to these crimes.18 
Again, one must wonder if, had the crimes committed in Višegrad not 
been excluded from the indictment, whether the weight of the gravity of 
the atrocities against the innocent women, children, and elderly, murdered 
as part of the widely recognized common plan, would have caused the 
Chamber to arrive at a Judgement of Genocide for Count 1.   
Another troubling development involved the release from imprisonment, 
on December 13, 2014, of Vojislav Šešelj, a chief hate-speech ideologue, 
for health reasons, only to have him return to Serbia where he experienced 
a "miraculous recovery".19 He was subsequently elected to parliament in 
 
 
18  Prosecutor v. Milan Lukić & Sredoje Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Judgement Summary 
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milan_lukic_sredoje_lukic/tjug/en/090720_judg_summary_en.pdf. 
19  The Prosecutor v Šešelj. (Order on the Provisional Release of the Accused Propio Motu).  
IT-03-67-T. Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 6, 2014. 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/tord/en/141106.pdf. Concerning Šešelj's "miraculous recovery" see, 














Serbia, where he continues to promote the idea of "Greater Serbia."20 In the 
Chamber's Judgement --in Šešelj's absence--it was determined that Šešelj 
was indeed Serbia's leading hate ideologue who spewed hate speech, 
recruited soldiers, and incited troops to eliminate non-Serbs. But in a 
surprising verdict, the Chamber concluded that the prosecution had not 
demonstrated a close enough "causal relation" between the hate speech 
and the atrocities committed, atrocities that have also been extensively 
documented. Šešelj was acquitted since the significance of his hate speech 
was minimized, and his role was reduced or diminished by the Chamber to 
that of being a political functionary, with no direct military role.21 
Moreover, the Chamber described the "conflict" as a "civil war" in which 
there were three equally prepared warring sides, rather than as an 
international conflict with eliminationist dimensions.22 This Judgement 
introduced a certain schizophrenia in the Tribunal's work, in the sense that 
in the course of the Tribunal's other Judgements, the "conflict" had been 
found to be an international armed conflict steered by Joint Criminal 
Enterprises including either Serb or Croatian nationals, and crimes had 
been judged to be genocide rather than simply part of a civil war. In other 
words, according to those Judgements, it was not a civil war.  For 
example, in the case of the Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić et. al., we read: 
The Chamber found by a majority, with the Presiding Judge 
dissenting, that the conflict between the HVO and the ABiH during 
this period was of an international character. Evidence has shown 
that troops of the Croatian Army fought alongside the HVO against 
 
 
20  Milka Domanovic & Marija Ristic, Vojislav Seselj Returns to Serbia After 11 Years,  
BALKAN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/vojislav-
seselj-arrives-to-serbia-after-11-years.  For Šešelj's election to Parliament see, e.g., Nationalist Seselj 
Returns To Serbian Parliament, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (June 3, 2016), 
http://www.rferl.org/media/video/serbia-seselj-parliament/27777077.html. See also Guy Delauney, 
Serbia elections: Radical Seselj back in parliament, BBC NEWS (April 25, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36128489.  
21  Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Judgement, ¶ 248 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/tjug/en/160331.pdf.  
22  Id.  











the ABiH and that the Republic of Croatia had overall control over 
the armed forces and the civilian authorities of the Croatian 
Community (and later Republic) of Herzeg-Bosna.23  
The Chamber found that the criminal enterprise in the Prlić case 
involved Croatian nationals, including Franjo Tuđman and Gojko Šušak, 
“whose goal was to permanently remove the Muslim population from 
Herceg-Bosna."24  
 The acquittal of Šešelj contradicted, moreover, part of the Karadžić 
Judgement in which the Chamber had found that Šešelj was part of the 
overarching Joint Criminal Enterprise, and in which his inflammatory 
speeches and the atrocities of his men are detailed.25 The first instance 
verdict in the Karadžić case found that:  
...Šešelj advocated for a homogeneous Greater Serbia which 
involved the unification of all Serb lands and the removal of the 
non-Serb population; as such he clearly shared the common plan. 
He sent large groups of SRS volunteer fighters to assist the Bosnian 
Serbs in BiH in the implementation of the common plan...26 
Diane Orentlicher asserts in her book, Some Kind of Justice, that 
Šešelj's acquittal "on all counts by a 2-1 decision was stunning" and quotes 
the reaction in the Economist --one among many--that the Trial Chamber's 
reasoning was "'so far-fetched'" that it "'defies belief'".27  In her partially 
dissenting opinion in the initial Šešelj verdict, Judge Flavia Lattanzi found 
"insufficient reasoning, or no reasoning at all" in the majority's findings 
 
 
23  Prosecutor v. Prlić et.al., Case No. IT-04-74-T, Judgement Summary (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia May 29, 2013), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/tjug/en/130529_summary_en.pdf 
(emphasis added).  
24  Id. 
25  Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgement, ¶ 3462 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016),  
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf. Also see, for example, ¶ 2602, ¶ 
2657, ¶ 2664, ¶ 2798, ¶ 3326, ¶ 3329. 
26  Id. at ¶ 3458 (emphasis added).  
27  See Diane Orentlicher, SOME KIND OF JUSTICE: THE ICTY’S IMPACT IN BOSNIA AND 
SERBIA, 188 (2018). See Vojislav Seselj's Acquittal is a Victory for Advocates of Ethnic Cleansing, 













and concluded with the following remarkable reflection:  
On reading the majority’s Judgement, I felt I was thrown back in 
time to a period in human history, centuries ago, when one said – 
and it was the Romans who used to say this to justify their bloody 
conquests and murders of their political opponents in civil wars: 
“silent enim leges inter arma”. [“In time of war the laws fall silent” 
(Cicero Oratio pro Milone, 52 BCE)]28 
Indeed, with the initial Šešelj verdict, one can surmise that the truth had 
been silenced as well. Eventually, however, upon appeal, Šešelj was 
convicted of an isolated instance of incitement and the Chamber affirmed 
that a widespread and systematic attack against the non-Serb population 
had taken place.29 At that point, however, it was not clear that public trust 
could be restored. 
II. SHORT SENTENCES AND EARLY RELEASES 
It has also been problematic that there are a number of cases in which 
perpetrators were convicted and sentenced, but then released early.  The 
case of Momčilo Krajšnik, a high ranking official in Republika Srpska 
who served in various capacities, can be mentioned briefly: "...the Trial 
Chamber found Krajišnik responsible for persecution, extermination, 
deportation, and inhumane acts, all crimes against humanity under Article 
5 of the Statute. The Trial Chamber imposed a single sentence of 27 years 
of imprisonment."30 On Appeal, however, his sentence was reduced to 20 
years.31 Subsequently, Krajišnik received an early release in 2013, after 
 
 
28  Prosecutor v Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-T, Summary of the Partially Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Lattanzi (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2016), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/tjug/en/160331_summary_of_the_partially_dissenting_opinion.pdf 
29  Prosecutor v Šešelj, Case No. MICT-16-99, Appeal Judgement (Int'l Residual Mechanism 
for Criminal Tribunals Apr. 11, 2018) https://www.irmct.org/en/cases/mict-16-99. 
30   Prosecutor v. Krajšnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Appeals Judgment Summary (Int'l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 17, 2009), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/krajisnik/acjug/en/090317_summary.pdf (emphasis added). 
31  Id. 











serving two-thirds of his sentence, and returned to his former war 
headquarters in the city of Pale in Republika Srpska where he received a 
hero's welcome.32 
 Another troubling case involved the conviction of three Bosnian 
Serbs for the unspeakable crimes of rape, torture, and enslavement. This 
was an important case of genuine historical significance since it inscribed 
rape as an international war crime in the annals of jurisprudence.33 
However, at least two of the three perpetrators (Radomir Kovač and Zoran 
Vuković) have already been released from prison, having served two-
thirds of their sentences.34 Bakira Hasečić, the president of the Association 
of Women Victims of War, "expressed outrage at the decision to free 
Kovač," and said, "‘it was wrong that war criminals only serve two-thirds 
of their sentences.’" Hasečić stated “This is not acceptable to us and we 
cannot understand it. I see this as a mockery of victims."35 The third 
convicted perpetrator, Dragoljub Kunarac, who was sentenced to 28 years, 
will soon have served 2/3 of his sentence and be eligible for release from 
prison.  The Judgement Summary detailed that "the rapes were used by 
members of the Bosnian Serb armed forces as an instrument of terror," and 
that "Muslim women and girls, mothers and daughters together, [were] 
robbed of the last vestiges of human dignity, women and girls treated like 
chattels, pieces of property at the arbitrary disposal of the Serb occupation 
forces, and more specifically, at the beck and call of the three accused."36 
The victims were as young as 12 and 15 years old. One needs to ask if the 
"civil war" narrative mentioned earlier, which had surfaced in the Šešelj 
 
 
32  Lana Pasic, Welcoming the 'villains' and 'heroes' of the Balkan wars: International tribunal's 
judgments on Balkan war crimes have not brought reconciliation to the region, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 4, 
2013), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/09/2013938155848853.html. 
33  Prosecutor v. Dragoljub, Kunarac & Kovac, Case No. IT-96-23-T& IT-96-23/1-T, 
Judgement (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf. 
34  Denic Džidić & Denis Džidić, Hague Frees Bosnia War Rapist Radomir Kovac, 
BALKANINSIGHT (July 4, 2013), https://balkaninsight.com/2013/07/04/another-hague-defendant-
granted-early-release. 
35  Id. 
36  Prosecutor v. Dragoljub, Kunarac & Kovac, Case No. IT-96-23-T& IT-96-23/1-T, 














Judgement, may have influenced the sentencing and treatment of the 
perpetrators. By contrast, in the Akayesu case in Rwanda, for example, the 
accused perpetrator was convicted of genocide, which included the crime 
of rape, and of rape as a crime against humanity and was sentenced to life 
in prison.37 In yet another case, Goran Jelišić, who described himself as a 
"Serb Adolf," and who was found guilty of numerous heinous murders of 
Bosniaks in Luka concentration camp and in the streets of Brčko, will be 
eligible for release in 2020, when he will have served two-thirds of his 
sentence.38 In addition, given the fact that the ICTY found, in the Karadžić 
Judgement, that there was a "common plan to permanently remove 
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb claimed 
territory"39--a fundamentally eliminationist or genocidal plan-- it is a matter 
of concern that there have been so few genocide convictions and life 









37  Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 
September 2, 1998), https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-4/trial-
judgements/en/980902.pdf. 
38  Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment Summary (Int'l Crim. Trib. for 
the former Yugoslavia December 14, 1999),  
 https://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/tjug/en/991214_summary_en.pdf 
39  Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgement, ¶ 3447, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia March 24, 2016),  
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf. 
40  Vujadin Popović, Ljubiša Beara, Ratko Mladić, and Radovan Karadžić have received life 
sentences. See Prosecutor v. Popović et.al., Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgement, ¶ 3447 (Int'l Crim. Trib. 
for the former Yugoslavia June 10, 2010), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tjug/en/100610judgement.pdf. 











III. AN ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: THE ICTY, THE MEDIA, AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY41 
One should wonder if the problematic dimensions of the Tribunal's 
legacy identified thus far are to some extent a reflection of the media's and 
the international community's failure to recognize and respond to the 
genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina when it was in progress. In other 
words, International Tribunals do not operate in a vacuum. For example, 
Thomas Friedman wrote in the New York Times on June 7, 1995: "I don't 
give two cents about Bosnia. Not two cents. The people there have 
brought on their own troubles."42 This callous comment came about one 
month before the Bosnian Serb forces seized the Srebrenica "safe area" 
and murdered 8,372 men and boys. Sarajevo scholar Edina Bećirević has 
emphasized that from the beginning the international community referred 
to the Bosnian Serb atrocities in Bosnia as "ethnic cleansing," thereby 
avoiding the "mandate imposed on them by the UN Convention on 
Genocide."43 This is also the argument of an article titled, "'Ethnic 
Cleansing' bleaches the atrocities of genocide": "The term 'ethnic 
cleansing' is used as a euphemism for genocide despite it having no legal 
status. Like 'Judenrein' and 'racial hygiene' in Nazi medicine, it 
expropriates pseudo-medical terminology to justify massacre. Use of the 
term reifies a dehumanized view of the victims as sources of filth and 
disease...The term ethnic cleansing corrupts observation, interpretation, 
ethical judgment and decision making..."44 According to this article, for 
most of the three years of the aggression from 1992 to 1995, the New 
 
 
41  The expression "Anxiety of Influence" is appropriated from Harold Bloom's book, The 
Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry (1973). In his book Bloom refers to a dimension of "intra-
poetic relationships" between authors and their texts as they negotiate the influence of predecessors on 
their work. This section reflects on the possible influence that the media and international community, 
including the United Nations may have had on the work of the ICTY, which itself operated in the 
context of public discourse. Further, the section considers the extent to which the ICTY Judgements, in 
turn, influence the media and international agencies. 
42 Thomas Friedman, Foreign Affairs; Allies, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 1995), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/07/opinion/foreign-affairs-allies.html. 
43  Edina Bećirević, Genocide on the Drina River ix (2014). 
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York Times usually used the phrase "ethnic cleansing" rather than 
"genocide". But the expression, "ethnic cleansing," was also wielded 
consistently by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In 
September 1994, a UNSC Resolution 941 demanded, for example, "that 
the Bosnian Serb authorities immediately cease their campaign of 'ethnic 
cleansing'."45 UNSC Resolution 819, which established the Srebrenica 
"safe area," condemned atrocities that were being committed by the 
Bosnian Serb forces as "ethnic cleansing."46 The Resolution uses the 
expression "ethnic cleansing" five times. It is important to note that the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had submitted an “Application 
instituting proceedings against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for 
violating the Genocide Convention,” to the International Court of Justice 
on March 20, 1993. The Application stated that “[t]he abominable crimes 
taking place in the Republic Bosnia-Herzegovina at this time can be called 
by only one name: genocide. Genocide is the most evil crime a State or 
human being can inflict on another State or human being. The sheer 
enormity of this crime requires that the nations of the world stand together 
as one, and with a single voice stop the destruction of the Bosnian 
people.”47 Hence, with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Application in March 
1993, the term “genocide” had been officially inserted into the domain of 
public discourse, along with the identification of the Serbian nationalist 
goal of a “Greater Serbia,” as well as an account of the ongoing 
“systematic shelling and starvation of large cities…by Yugoslav/Serbian 
forces,” crimes of which “civilians were the primary targets…”48 
 If the media and none other than the United Nations Security Council 
avoided the use of the term genocide and thereby influenced not only the 
"court of public opinion," but also the ICTY itself, is it possible that the 
ICTY proceedings and Judgements have minimized the atrocities that 
 
 
45  SCOR Resolution 41 (23 September 1994), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/941. 
46  SCOR Resolution 819 (16 April 1993), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/819. 
47  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Application Instituting Proceedings 
(March 23, 1993) (International Court of Justice). 
48  Id. 











were committed and, in turn, have influenced the media?   For example, on 
November 19, 2018, an article about Bosnia and Herzegovina in the New 
York Times had a highlighted caption that referred to "tribal fighting," a 
phrase that also elides the fact of the rulings of genocide.49 This "tribal 
fighting" caption would lead one to believe that the various Bosnian ethnic 
groups were and are the source of their problems, echoing, in 2018, 
Thomas Friedman's callous dismissal and demonization of a people in 
1995. Another article in the Spanish newspaper El País in November 
2018, also suggested a moral equivalency, or a shared responsibility for 
the atrocities in a reassertion of the civil war narrative.50 Perhaps this 
perspective led the author to make an inexplicably egregious error. The 
article claimed that the memorial to the murdered children in Sarajevo 
only includes the names of Muslim children and that it unfairly excludes 
the names of the children of Serb ethnicity who were victims. This claim 
was false since the memorial also includes the names of the children who 
were of Serb and Croat ethnicity. But such errors engender a 
misunderstanding of the genocide and prevent an effective response to the 
deepening political crisis in the region. One must wonder if the avoidance 
of the term genocide by the media and by the United Nations Security 
Council, through the use of the phrase "ethnic cleansing," may have 
eventually influenced international perception about the crimes that were 
committed. The phrase “ethnic cleansing” may have provided the 
international community and the ICTY with a convenient excuse. In his 
book, Surviving the Peace: The Struggle for Postwar Recovery in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Peter Lippman considers the failure to seek and achieve 
convictions for genocide and other crimes to be the result of  "a lack of 
political will”: "The failure to work toward a closer examination and a 
coherent understanding of the nature of the nationalist regimes that 
fomented the war enables the powerful states of the world, ultimately, to 
ignore the criminal nature of those regimes"...and "prevents the greater 
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powers from recognizing genocide and taking the responsibility to prevent 
it."51 
And one must wonder, finally, if the avoidance of the term genocide by 
the media and by international organizations has been subtended by a 
certain Islamophobia. While the atrocities were in progress in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bosnian Muslims and other pro-Bosnia forces were 
hampered by an arms embargo that had been imposed. In his book The 
Clinton Tapes, based on conversations with President Clinton, Taylor 
Branch reports that "U.S. Allies in Europe blocked proposals to adjust or 
remove the embargo" since they felt that "an independent Bosnia would be 
'unnatural' as the only Muslim nation in Europe."52 According to Branch, 
President Clinton reported that "President François Mitterand of France 
had been especially blunt in saying that Bosnia did not belong and that 
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IV. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: GENOCIDE DENIAL, THE 
GLORIFICATIION OF WAR CRIMINALS, AND THE SUPPRESSION OF 
MEMORIALS FOR THE VICTIMS 
With this combination of short sentences and early releases and the 
paucity of genocide convictions, it seems that the ICTY has failed to 
establish a decisive narrative about the perpetrator and the victim. The lack 
of such a narrative that would clearly identify the aggressor and the victim 
has given way to or has accompanied the resurgence of nationalism, 
threats of secession, genocide denial and the glorification of convicted war 
criminals in Republika Srpska, all of which can been seen as real threats to 
the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The leadership of Republika Srpska 
has consistently denied genocide and other war crimes. Pronouncements 
of the denial of the Srebrenica genocide have been nothing if not 
numerous and consistent. In 2014, Milorad Dodik, who is currently the 
Bosnian-Serb member of the Bosnian Presidency, denied the genocide and 
praised Karadžić and Mladić as heroes.54 In 2015, he stated that the 
genocide at Srebrenica was the "biggest sham of the 20th century."55 In 
July 2018, the Assembly of Republika Srpska rejected a 2004 Commission 
report on the Srebrenica genocide.56 It was reported that the Assembly of 
Republika Srpska "called for the entity's current government to revoke the 
report and form a new, international investigatory commission."57  In 
November 2018, Ana Brnabić, Prime Minister of Serbia, also refused to 
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acknowledge the Srebrenica genocide.58 
 In addition to the explicit denial of the Srebrenica genocide, there is 
an ongoing glorification of convicted war criminals, through memorials, 
commemorative plaques, and the dedication of buildings. A number of 
examples spanning 2016 and 2017 can be briefly mentioned. On March 
20, 2016, a student dormitory in Pale was dedicated to Radovan Karadžić, 
several days before he was to be convicted of genocide.59 That same week, 
billboards appeared in East Sarajevo (Republika Srpska) bearing the 
images of Radovan Karadžić and Vojislav Šešelj and declaring them to be 
“Serbian Heroes.”60 On October 24, 2016, during the 25th anniversary of 
the founding of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, Nedeljko 
Čubrilović, President of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, 
presented certificates of appreciation to convicted war criminals Radovan 
Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić, and Momčilo Krajišnik.61 On April 12, 2017, a 
Russian cross was erected on a hill in Višegrad to commemorate the 
Russian volunteers who had served in the Army of Republika Srpska, the 
very troops who committed atrocities in Višegrad and across the territory 
of Republika Srpska, 1992–1995.62 The glorification of war criminals 
continues unabated in Republika Srpska.63 
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 In addition to memorials to the convicted perpetrators, the authorities 
in Republika Srpska are particularly cruel in their prohibition or 
suppression of memorials for the victims, since such memorials for the 
victims would formally inscribe the narrative of war crimes and guilt 
within the territory of Republika Srpska.  Survivors of the Omarska and 
Trnopolje concentration camps in Prijedor municipality within Republika 
Sprska have not been permitted to install memorials on the sites of the 
former camps. Survivors are allowed to visit the site of the Omarska camp, 
located then and now on the grounds of a private mining company, one 
day each year, on August 6, which is the symbolic date for the closing the 
camp in 1992, following the discovery of the camp by journalists. 
Survivors are permitted to gather at the site of the camp from 
approximately 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. to commemorate the camp and 
remember the victims. The survivors, family members, and supporters are 
monitored closely by guards and are not permitted to install a memorial in 
the camp. The survivors and their supporters release white balloons to 
which the names of the victims attached. This prohibition of a memorial in 
Prijedor is discriminatory since there is a memorial for the perpetrators 
that has been installed at the site of the former Trnopolje concentration 
camp, but there is no memorial for the victims. 64  The Trnopolje 
community center, which was one of the camp buildings, has been 
renovated and a memorial to the perpetrators has been installed.65 In 
August 2019, it was reported that the mayor of the Prijedor Municipality 
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community center building as well.66 Hence the camp building has been re-
purposed in a way that effectively erases the memory of the concentration 
camp.  
 In High Representative Valentin Inzko's moving comments at the 
July 11, 2018 commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide, he stated that "a 
dignified funeral is the oldest right of humans – the oldest human right of 
every human, of every victim."67 He suggested that such a practice is an 
expression of our very humanity. This "oldest human right"68 has been 
challenged by the practice of hiding the evidence of the crimes that were 
committed in mass graves within the territory of Republika Srpska. In the 
case of Srebrenica, Prijedor, and elsewhere, some victims' human remains 
have still not been located or identified, so the installation of a memorial 
or memorials is profoundly important for the grieving relatives, as it 
would be the only possible social alternative to a proper burial. 
 The leadership of Republika Srpska consistently reaffirms the 
genocidal intention of the founding members of Republika Srpska by 
demeaning the survivors, and even by accusing the refugees of "re-
occupying" the homes from which they were forcibly expelled.69 These 
political and rhetorical strategies are aimed at continuing to achieve the 
goal of the 1990s in Republika Srpska, namely, the goal of ethnic 
homogeneity at the cost of the future of multicultural Bosnia. Through 
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various methods of psychological intimidation and re-traumatization, the 
authorities of Republika Srpska seek to prevent non-Serbs from returning 
to their homes in Republika Srpska.  In his speech in Andrićgrad on June 
28, 2018, in a rhetorical effort to re-enact the myth of a "Greater Serbia," 
former President of Republika Srpska, spoke of Serb victimization and the 
need for ethnic homogeneity and autonomy.70 Then, on July 11, 2018, 
SNSD Party leader Rajko Vasić denied the genocide and threatened a new 
genocide.71 Vasić's hate speech was condemned by the High 
Representative, who asserted: 
The statement made by Rajko Vasic, SNSD Main Board member, 
on the Srebrenica genocide – on the day of the burial of Srebrenica 
genocide victims and the day of commemoration – goes far beyond 
a denial. Apart from being deplorable, hurtful and offensive, it 
threatens violence. And not any violence. It threatens genocide. 
This is a criminal offence. The Federation Criminal Code contains a 
specific incrimination, and the Federation Criminal Code is for such 
offences applicable wherever they are committed. The High 
Representative urges the competent judicial bodies to promptly 
react.72  
The leadership of Republika Srpska has failed to take responsibility for 
genocide and other war crimes, and that failure, through denial and the 
glorification of convicted war criminals has contributed to an increasingly 
exclusionary culture of inhumane cruelty toward survivors.  
 In his report to the U.N. Security Council, on April 17, 2019, the 
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High Representative expressed concern about a number of negative 
developments, including challenges to "the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Presidency member Milorad Dodik being again the most frequent 
exponent of such proclamations."73 The High Representative further 
specified that "certain officials from the Republika Srpska continued to 
make frequent statements denying the statehood of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, while advocating for the secession of the Republika Srpska 
and a union with Serbia, saying for instance that the Republika Srpska is 
'already separated'."74 The High Representative referred ominously in his 
report to changes to the Law on Police and Internal Affairs in Republika 
Srpska that creates a reserve police force: "In April, the Republika Srpska 
National Assembly moved forward with legislation to create a reserve 
police force...This move, interpreted by some as an attempt to build an 
alternative military force, raised grave concerns in the Federation. ...The 
issue has also been seen in the light of the previous controversy over the 
disproportionate purchases of long-barrel weapons by the RS police."75 The 
High Representative emphasized that the situation "does not contribute to 
peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina."76 He expressed concern 
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that, in spite of the fact that Annex 7 of the Peace Agreement guarantees 
the right of return, "Recent incidents have undermined the confidence of 
returnees to areas where their ethnic group represents a numerical 
minority." He was recalling the fact that on March 10, 2019 "the Ravna 
Gora Serb ultra-nationalist Chetnik movement ...held its annual gathering 
in the Višegrad area, most wearing black uniforms and insignia similar to 
uniforms worn by Serb paramilitaries in the 1990s."77 The High 
Representative's sobering report bearing on the range of threats to the 
peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina calls the ICTY's contribution to "the 
restoration and maintenance of peace" into question.78  
V. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A FUTURE 
As the ICTY has pursued its "completion strategy," as part of which 
some cases have been transferred to national jurisdictions, and the 
Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals has been established "to 
continue the jurisdiction, rights and obligations and essential functions of 
the ICTY," as well as "to maintain the Tribunal's legacy,"79 divisive 
nationalist rhetoric and threats to peace and stability in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, as detailed by the report of the High Representative, as well 
as in reports in the media, have been on the rise. This essay has suggested 
that such nationalist rhetoric, including genocide denial, the glorification 
of war criminals, challenges to Bosnia's sovereignty, and threats of 
secession, has, arguably, been emboldened by the ICTY's failure to 
establish a narrative that accurately identifies the "perpetrator" and the 
"victim". In this sense, the ICTY has failed to shape public discourse in a 
way that would contribute to reconciliation and peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and in the region. It should not escape our attention that the 
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ICTY's failure to contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace 
has had implications for the rise of ultra-nationalism and anti-Muslim hate 
crimes in Europe and beyond. The current glorification of war criminals in 
Republika Srpska and the public gatherings of the Ravna Gora Serb ultra-
nationalist Chetnik association wearing Serb paramilitary uniforms has 
ensured the legacy of convicted war criminals Radovan Karadžić and 
Ratko Mladić, as Serb nationalism and hate speech continue unabated in 
Bosnia. 80 However, this glorification of Serb nationalism has also 
"inspired" anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant terrorists in Europe and New 
Zealand. The terrorist who murdered 77 people in Norway in 2011, and 
the terrorist who murdered at least 50 people and wounded 49 others in 
shootings at two mosques in Christchurch New Zealand, indicated in their 
utterances, actions and manifestos that they were modeling themselves 
after their hero Radovan Karadžić and his Serb nationalism.81 As the ICTY 
has failed to effectively address Serb nationalism at its source, nationalism 
has resurged in Republika Srpska and in Europe. In their article in Foreign 
Policy, May 24, 2019, Azeem Ibrahim and Hikmet Karčić put it this way: "The 
war marked a pivotal point in European history. Murderers and fascists 
were not only let off the hook but also glorified—live on television. With 
that precedent burned into the collective memory of a generation, the 
resurgence of European fascism writ large was only a matter of time."82 
 Such a grim assessment of the legacy of the ICTY, as its work comes 
to an end, and in spite of the virtues to which it lays claim, calls out for 
ways to respond to the propagation of such divisive rhetoric. One 
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possibility would be to think in terms of a restorative justice model, as an 
alternative to traditional judicial processes, in order to find a way forward. 
Restorative justice involves an effort "to right the wrong" that was 
committed.83 The effort must respond to the needs of the victims and also 
involve the assumption of responsibility by the perpetrator.84 At a 
minimum, an effort to seek restorative or reparative justice would include 
a public statement of the acceptance of responsibility, by the leadership of 
Republika Srpska, for the war crimes committed in its name.85 The 
government of Republika Srpska would need to authorize the installation 
and protection of memorials for the victims in Foča, Prijedor, Višegrad, 
and elsewhere, memorials that would contribute to a sense of justice for 
the victims and advance the possibility of local reconciliation. A genuine 
commitment to restorative justice would also include the removal of 
memorials glorifying convicted war criminals. The current leadership of 
Republika Srpska should formally disassociate itself from the founding 
members of Republika Srpska, almost all of whom have been convicted of 
war crimes, including genocide. National laws would need to be 
implemented that would prohibit genocide denial and the glorification of 
war criminals. Finally, a national commitment would need to be made to 
offer compensation and support to victims of sexual violence. A genuine 
effort at restorative justice would need, most importantly, to "right the 
wrong" of the crimes that were committed by addressing the very cause of 
the crimes.86 Republika Srpska was founded with the intent to create an 
ethnically homogeneous entity.  In the Karadžić verdict, it was determined 
that he and his Joint Criminal Enterprise sought "to permanently remove 
the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb claimed 
territory."87 This "Bosnian Serb claimed territory" was the entity known 
today as "Republika Srpska".  After the commission of war crimes 
designed to create an ethnically homogeneous entity, the Dayton Peace 
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Accords recognized Republika Srpska as an entity within Bosnia. This 
recognition was nothing less than a reward for a successful genocide. In 
other words, the fundamental work at hand is to "right the wrong" of the 
recognition and legitimization of Republika Srpska by the Dayton Peace 
Accords. This can only be accomplished through the reunification of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multicultural, democratic nation. Only the 
reunification of Bosnia and Herzegovina would provide the possibility of 
genuinely restorative justice for the victims of the genocide because it 
would effectively address the cause of the atrocities and the trauma.88 Yet 
such efforts to repair the social fabric and to restore a sense of community 
seem increasingly unlikely. Republika Srpska refuses to accept 
responsibility for the crimes committed in its name. When Bosnia's SDA 
party (the Party for Democratic Action, historically a Bosniak political 
party), proposed constitutional reform that would reunify Bosnia as a 
republic and would determine nationality on the basis of citizenship rather 
than ethnicity,89 the Bosnian Serb member of the Presidency, Milorad 
Dodik, and leader of the SNSD party (Alliance of Independent Social 
Democrats, a Bosnian Serb political party) dismissed the proposal as an 
essentially Islamic plot.90 Mr. Dodik's inflammatory reaction included 
Islamophobic fear-mongering as he predicted that, if the resolution were to 
come to pass, Bosnia would risk falling under the rule of Sharia law.91 
 It seems that, as the ICTY's has fallen short of its mandate, it has 
emboldened nationalist hate speech and Islamophobia, and it has all but 
foreclosed the possibility of restorative justice for the victims of the 
genocide in Bosnia. Perhaps the extent to which the ICTY failed to 
contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace in Bosnia and the 
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region can be discerned in the decision of Nobel Committee for Literature 
to award the Nobel Prize to an author, Peter Handke, who has denied the 
Srebrenica genocide and who has been identified for his support for 
Serbian nationalism and for Slobodan Milošević.92 Željko Komšić, 
Chairperson of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina compared the 
Nobel Committee's selection of Mr. Handke, to giving the award to 
someone who denies the Holocaust, and stated that as such it is 
"completely inappropriate and contradicts all moral norms."93 Yet the 
Nobel Committee's selection indicates that the work of the ICTY has 
failed to establish a decisive narrative regarding the truth of the genocidal 
aggression, a narrative that could well have prevented the Nobel 
Committee from making its choice.  
 In the wake of the problematic legacy of the ICTY with respect to its 
mandate, threats to the peace are accelerating at an alarming pace.94 The 
persistence of genocide denial and the glorification of war criminals in 
Republika Srpska are practices that condone and even celebrate the war 
crimes that were committed. Hariz Halilović has written that such a 
celebration of genocide is a new stage of genocide that he refers to as 
"triumphalism."95 Such "triumphalism" in Republika Srpska celebrates the 
genocide with posters, banners, and t-shirts depicting Karadžić, Mladić, 
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and Šešelj, for example, as heroes.96 Such a celebration condones the 
violence and suggests that the crimes could be repeated. The international 
community has a responsibility, then, to respond to the rise of 
destabilizing rhetoric, including the blatant challenges to the sovereignty 
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